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Using Country Of Origin In Strategy:  
The Importance Of Context And Strategic Action 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Although the idea that a nation's image is a factor in buying decisions has long been accepted, 
research on the effect of country-of-origin (COO) on consumers' evaluation of brands and on 
firms' strategic positioning is contradictory. The strategic use of COO would appear to be highly 
dependent on context. The authors examine six agribusinesses in New Zealand - all of who use 
COO to varying degrees in their global brand programs - and argue that the use of COO is highly 
contextual and evolves over time. The different contextual elements affecting the appropriateness 
of COO programs are then explored. In the final part of the article, the implications of using 
COO for firms' strategic actions are discussed, and the benefits and limitations of COO are 
identified. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Several authors contend that COO is important in buying decisions (1-9). For example, findings 
suggest that the geographical location from which a product originates is linked to the brand and 
generates secondary associations (7, 10-11). There are, however, authors who claim that COO is 
of little importance in brand evaluation (12-14). Studies also show that highlighting COO may 
backfire on an unknown country if competitive counterparts have better profiles, even with 
products where research indicates that COO plays little part in brand evaluation (15).  
 
Despite several years of research on the importance of (COO), the strategic uses and limitations 
of COO remain unclear (1-2, 4-5). Firstly, a review of the COO research found that COO can be 
operationalised in several ways, but that a number of firm, consumer, strategic, historical, and 
product-related variables influence the appropriateness of this use (1-5). This would indicate a 
contingent model of COO (16). Secondly, entrepreneurship theory would suggest that firm action 
could potentially have an effect on the nature of competition and the structure of the market (17-
18). This suggests that firms who use COO affect the nature of the market they operate in, and 
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that the use of COO would, therefore, evolve over time. As a result, not only is the use of COO 
contingent on different contextual factors, but the appropriateness of COO changes in response to 
changes in context. Developing a model, which accounts for these factors, would enable 
managers and researchers to gain a greater understanding of the benefits and limits of COO, as 
well as draw necessary boundary conditions around the concept (19).  
 
Agribusiness provides an excellent context in which to study the effect and role of COO, as 
agricultural products have historically been tied to COO or region-of-origin (ROO) (20). New 
Zealand has a well-established reputation for agricultural production (21), and as such meets 
O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy's (7) requirement for reputational capital in respect to 
agricultural product categories. The agribusinesses included in the research were Merino New 
Zealand, Sealord, the New Zealand Game Industry Board, the New Zealand Dairy Board (now 
Fontera Group), the Wine Institute of New Zealand, and Zespri (kiwifruit). These particular 
businesses actively use COO as part of their international positioning strategy and were, 
therefore, deemed appropriate for this research. 
 
STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 
 
Our article is built from a multiple case study of six agricultural marketing (or producer) boards, 
all of who have operationalised COO to varying extents in their global branding programs. As we 
have proposed a relationship between context and the use of COO, we first examine the extant 
literature on COO. We then present the research methodology used to collect the data. The case 
study method - with an embedded design with six cases – was believed to be an appropriate 
method for getting an understanding of how boards operationalise COO in global branding 
programs.Moving on, we report on the case findings. The findings highlight a number of other 
contextual variables not identified previously in the literature such as COO-product category 
history and legitimacy. We also identify how the use of COO programs by the various producers 
have had an affect on the marketplace, necessitating the evolution of COO use. The findings 
imply a contingency model of COO and suggest that the use of COO needs to be placed within a 
dynamic, evolutionary framework. We then proceed to discuss the findings with reference to 
 4 
further relevant literature, as well as to identify managerial implications and areas for future 
research. 
 
COO AND CONTEXT 
 
Research indicates that context has the potential to influence the appropriateness of COO strategy 
(1-2). The research on COO suggests a number of contextual variables affecting the strategic use 
of COO including consumer-related variables, as well as product and COO-product category 
varials, and relationship-related variables. We will briefly review each of these areas in order.  
 
Although there is extensive research on the effects of COO on consumers (1), much of it remains 
contradictory (3, 7, 22), and there is little consideration of when firms should include COO in 
their brand programs, or what role COO plays in the make-up of an overall brand positioning 
statement (2). Papadopoulos (1) found that, in certain instances, consumers use COO cues when 
evaluating products. These cues are often used in judgements about product quality, or status 
acceptability. However, all consumers making product evaluations do not use COO, nor do they 
use it in the same way (2). COO is stronger among the elderly (23), the less educated, and the 
politically conservative (24). Personal background and socialisation also effect consumers' 
reception to COO (2). Consumer expertise has also been found to be important: novices use COO 
when they evaluate a product whereas experts only rely on COO stereotypes when they have no, 
or only ambiguous, product attribute information (25-26). This would suggest that the impact of 
COO on purchase choice and brand evaluation is contextually driven and must, therefore, be used 
with some caution. Perceptions of COO also change over time when consumers have acquired 
more knowledge about the country, when the marketing practices supporting the product are 
improved, or when the quality of the product is enhanced (27). Loussaïef (22) found that highly 
involved consumers are more sensitive to COO, but that this sensitivity diminishes, as they 
become more familiar with the product.  
 
Firms must be careful when using COO images, and in how far they rely on them for market 
differentiation. Research indicates that a strong brand name can reduce the strength of COO 
effects (2). Moreover, giving prominence to COO may reduce sales, regardless of perceptions of 
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quality, among consumers who feel animosity to the stated COO (28). For example, consumers in 
Nanjing, China remain angry at the actions of the Japanese army in the 1937 and are unwilling to 
purchase Japanese goods, even though they rate their quality highly. This phenomenon is also 
found at a business-to-business level, with New Zealand buyers' being reluctant to purchase 
French products because of the France's action against Greenpeace in New Zealand territory, 
even though they perceive French products to be of high quality (29). Finally, giving prominence 
to COO or ROO may enhance consumer awareness of this issue, even when they do not make 
purchasing decisions based upon these factors. For example Areni, Duhan, and Kiecker (15) 
found that by drawing Texan wine consumers' attention to ROO, they increased their purchases 
of wines from other regions, even though they did not normally make decisions based upon 
ROO. By highlighting ROO, the Texan wine industry raised the prominence of ROO in 
consumers' minds, causing them to make judgements based upon perceived quality and ROO, 
and driving them to purchase wines from more prestigious regions such as California. 
 
Product-related variables also play a role in the use of COO (1-3). For example, COO is often 
more effective for agricultural products than for manufactures given the historical association 
between produce and COO and/or ROO (20). Research indicates that COO is only effective if 
there is a clear link between the product category and COO (2-3, 20, 22). For example, Russia 
may be associated with poor quality, except in the case of caviar where product labelled with 
'Russia' or surprisingly 'USSR' fetches much higher prices than caviar from other nations. Other 
product-related variables affecting the use of COO include product complexity (COO is more 
important for complex products), the level of development in the country of origin, historical 
associations between the country of origin and certain products (for example, France has a history 
of producing clothing and food), and the strength of such product category-COO images (1-2, 4). 
This indicates that COO images will have more 'legitimacy' (16, 30) in some instances than in 
others. For example, Japanese wine producers would find it difficult to market their wine using 
COO, whereas Japanese electronics manufacturers would have far more credibility (1).  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Data was gathered using in-depth case studies. As the authors sought cases of agricultural 
marketing (or producer) boards that have developed brand programs employing COO to some 
extent (as opposed to straight commodity producers), the sampling procedure was purposeful. An 
overview of the six agribusinesses is presented in Appendix 1. Merino NZ represents the the 
interests of merino farmers in New Zealand, while the WINZ undertakes generic country-based 
promotion to raise awareness of New Zealand wine in key markets. The NZDB is responsible for 
selling and branding most of New Zealand’s dairy produce, and Zespri is seeking to develop a 
global brand, as well as to own a category in stores. The NZGIB supports New Zealand venison 
producers. Sealord is a company that sells a large range of branded and unbranded fish. 
 
In all, 46 interviews were conducted. The steps in developing theory followed the approach of 
Eisenhardt (31). Since the industries consist of many participants (e.g., farmers, suppliers, buyers, 
retailers, processors, and industry representatives), where applicable, an embedded case design 
was used (32), with the number of interviews being dependent on the complexity of each case, 
the availability of secondary information, and the role of the respective producer boards. A 
standard set of questions were used for each interview and centred around seven key categories:  
 
 History and development of the strategy; 
 History of the market environment; 
 Content of current and past strategies, 
 Market entry; 
 Performance; 
 Supply chain management; and 
 Future aims and challenges. 
 
This interview protocol formed a guide for each interview, as new issues emerged in each case 
that required further investigation. Secondary information was obtained for each case. For 
example, McKinsey & Company reviewed the wool and dairy industries in New Zealand (33-34). 
In the case of Zespri, the authors referred to consumer behavior studies on the effectiveness of 
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Zespri's brand program (35). An independent search of the media (press and television) was also 
conducted, as all six cases have a high profile in New Zealand. Appendix 2 provides an overview 
of the numerous data sources that were used in the research, and also details how many 
interviews were conducted in each of the six agricultural settings. The information from 
secondary sources often confirmed some findings, but also challenged the views of the 
interviewees. For example, the WINZ's view that their COO strategy was effective in terms of 
positioning was contradicted by other research (36) forcing the WINZ to move beyond their 
original strategy. In all, over 200 such documents were reviewed. 
 
Following this, each case was analyzed using a dual process of within-case analysis and across-
case analysis (37). Firstly, a draft of the case was developed and returned to each interviewee. 
The interviewees gave extensive feedback, although much of it consisted of correcting dates, 
answering questions posed by the authors, or commenting on interpretations. The interviewees 
also answered the challenges posed by the secondary information. A release was gained from 
each organization for the use of the case, as the authors wanted to identify each case by name. 
Secondly, the authors coded each case and discussed the codes with two experienced qualitative 
researchers. A series of themes, which were identified and explored across all cases, form the 
basis of the subsequent section. Although the case study may take a variety of forms (32), the 
essential characteristic is that explicit presentations of the key evidence, which were used to draw 
conclusions, are contained. This is achieved by presenting selected text evidence that is 
representative and supportive of our research findings.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
We will now proceed to discuss the findings. It should be noted that the case study method is 
discursive, and readers often find the lengthy description of results exhausting. For example, as 
mentioned in the methodology section, each case was analyzed using a dual process of within-
case analysis and across-case analysis. Reporting on each of the six agribusinesses and then the 
cross-cases analysis would be very detailed for the purposes of this article. We therefore decided 
to give a general background to the agribusinesses' brand programs in Appendix 3, while an 
overview of the successes achieved by each agribusiness is presented in Appendix 4, and the 
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challenges encountered by each agribusiness is outlined in Appendix 5. In the rest of this section, 
the findings from the cross-case analysis are examined, while findings from particular programs 
are discussed only when they differ from the cross-case findings. 
 
Each case developed a series of promotional programs, which utilised COO to varying degrees. 
The use of COO was generally consistent with the role of each board. For example, the WINZ 
plays a supportive role for its members, and as such seeks to develop programs to give the entire 
industry some collective force. To do so, they base most of their programs around COO, with the 
aim of raising consumer and trade awareness of New Zealand's wine-making potential. The 
promotion of individual regions within New Zealand, or specific brands, is left up to each region 
or winery. Many wineries will work closely with WINZ representatives in trade shows and 
provide extra funding for their own separate trade booth in the New Zealand stand. All the 
research participants believed there were significant gains to be had by acting in this collective 
manner. Examples included the wine and game industries: 
 
We find that the best way for us to expand the New Zealand market share overseas is 
to go in as a group, and - that way - we make a bigger impact. We'll go to trade fairs; 
we'll do tastings to the media, and to the wine writers. We'll do tastings at stores; do 
New Zealand promotions at retail outlets, and to the consumer. That is really the best 
strategy for us. (Wine company) 
 
We sat around and asked, 'okay, what should we do on behalf of this industry that we 
might not do ourselves, or couldn't do ourselves, or shouldn't do ourselves?' That 
gave it a whole lot more strength than any other organization [could have done 
themselves] because the producers and exporters sat down and actually levelled the 
playing field in terms of actually getting co-operation between the different sectors. 
(NZGIB) 
 
The above two quotes come from organizations that have no 'single desk selling’ powers. 
Organizations such as Zespri, and the NZDB, by law, have the right to market and sell all 
kiwifruit, or dairy-related products produced in New Zealand. Merino NZ do not have this right, 
 9 
but have convinced their members to sell through one program because of their (relatively) small 
production levels. Only Zespri enforce this power, with the NZDB allowing small and specialist 
exporters (e.g., goat or sheep milk producers) to sell under their own brands. As a result of these 
powers, any COO program affects the whole industry. However, the operationalization of COO 
depends on four important factors: the history of the industry, the aim of each board, the industry 
structure, and the market forces. 
 
All the strategies developed by the respective boards are influenced by past program failures, and 
the historical baggage that each industry brought with it to the market. In the case of the former, 
the difficulties faced by the NZGIB in Germany led them to develop a new program for different 
channels in the US. While Germany is the largest market for venison, sellers face powerful 
buyers who are unreceptive to branding programs, preferring instead to blend venison from 
various countries into their own branded products. As a result, after 20 years of presence in 
Germany, the New Zealand industry only had two per cent brand recognition. The inability to 
gain any brand awareness, and to differentiate the product based upon COO, meant that New 
Zealand producers were unable to differentiate their product from European deer infected with 
radiation as a result of the Chernobyl disaster. Because of that, prices collapsed, and the industry 
went through a period of rationalisation. In the case of Zespri, failure to protect the name 
'kiwifruit' meant that other, non-New Zealand, lower cost producers could use the name, 
regardless of COO, many of whom could out-compete New Zealand growers on cost. Despite 
this, Zespri still base their program around COO. For example: 
 
The kiwifruit's New Zealand nature was a very important component of the brand and 
had to be incorporated, given the equity we had in our country of origin. (Zespri) 
 
Research indicates that Zespri's promotion has simply raised awareness of the category rather 
than of the Zespri fruit, thus assisting competitors (35). Consumers also are not prepared to pay 
extra for Zespri fruit even though they generally prefer fruit brands, but they are willing to pay 
more for the new kiwifruit varieties (these varieties do not get separate brand exposure).  
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In the case of the wine industry, a history of poor product quality and low exports meant that the 
industry faced (justifiably) hostile, and ignorant markets. While quality improvements reduced 
the hostility, lack of knowledge of New Zealand as a wine-producing nation meant that the 
WINZ had to raise the profile of the country in order to build a strong COO-product category 
relationship in the marketplace. For example: 
 
When the UK office was set up in 1991, the main objective was to help facilitate the 
development of a 'New Zealand' category in retail outlets, restaurants, or wherever we 
could get the name 'New Zealand'. (WINZ) 
 
It is important in the wine industry to gain a separate COO in-store category, so as to provide 
consumers with a clear location to search out the product. One winery stated: 
 
One of the most tangible early success factors [in any export market] would be the 
establishment of a New Zealand category. [In some markets] New Zealand wine is 
currently found in the 'Australian', 'New World', or 'other' categories. If you're in the 
'Australian' section you're getting closer to home, but its still not quite right. If you're 
in the 'New World' section you've got all and sundry there, and if you're in the 'all 
other' section then your wines are along-side Israel, Bulgaria, Romania, and that's no 
good for anybody. (Wine company) 
 
The success of the program, and changes in markets, limits the ability of the WINZ's COO 
program in one market. For example, in overseas supermarkets there is increasing pressure on 
shelf space, and the achievement of a 'New Zealand category' can be a two-edged sword. While it 
provides a clear country brand for consumers, a new wine entering into this category does so at 
the expense of another New Zealand wine. This has led the WINZ to encourage wineries to enter 
new markets: 
 
In the UK we have established a category for New Zealand wine. That means that 
there is a distinct category and a distinct number of wines within that category that 
the buyers actually want. So for new wineries coming in, rather than expanding the 
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category, distributors tend to displace a New Zealand wine in the category to make 
way for a new one. In other markets such as the US and Australia there's no firm 
category established so they don't know how many New Zealand wines they want 
within a price point or varietal, so it's a lot more open. (WINZ) 
 
Moreover, the success of gaining a 'New Zealand category' and raising the profile of New 
Zealand wines has led to calls for more subtlety from wine journalists, who are highly influential 
on buyers at the top end of the market (which New Zealand winemakers target). Research 
indicates that 'the benefits and riches of a clean green land' was 'a bit tired', and that since New 
Zealand was a proven quantity the WINZ should start to educate consumers about the different 
producing regions. However, research also indicates that not all consumers share this view. In 
this situation it may be that a two-pronged strategy needs to be developed and targeted at 
different segments. The same occurred for the NZGIB in Germany. Traditional consumers would 
be uncomfortable with COO-branded venison, as they were looking to purchase deer that had 
been hunted in the wild. For example: 
 
In Germany it is currently a darn sight easier to sell New Zealand venison as local 
game meat than it is to try and raise the idea that it came from New Zealand and it 
might be farm raised - things that would raise concerns for the traditional German 
game consumer. However, these game consumers are getting older and there is a 
group of younger people that understand the benefits of venison in terms of it being 
clean and green, low in fat, high in iron, and an all year round meat. So you've got to 
move slightly from the traditional game consumer to the new game consumer, and 
that will be the focus of our European strategy. (NZGIB) 
 
The lack of COO-product category also impacted on the NZGIB's strategy for the US. NZGIB 
faced both general market ignorance of New Zealand, as well as of the product (venison). While 
American consumers knew what deer was, the cultural image of deer was influenced by the Walt 
Disney 'Bambi' character, and thus meant that branding could not be tied to animal based 
imagery. Consumer research showed that environmental purity and health-related issues were 
important (e.g., low level of fat and high level of iron), so the NZGIB positioned the product 
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around New Zealand's clean environment and backed this up with health-related claims. The deer 
industry in New Zealand consists of a number of high profile deer exporters, who were unwilling 
to give up their individual brand programs in favour of a COO based one. Therefore, the NZGIB 
needed a vehicle that could work with other producers, provide category support, and provide 
COO recognition. They developed an appellation program under the name 'Cervena' which stood 
for New Zealand, naturally farmed, and high-quality venison. The strategy was based on the 
appellation controllée system used in Champagne, whereby the name 'Champagne' indicates the 
ROO, and a level of quality, but the product is differentiated further by the brand of the 
individual Champagne house (e.g., Bollinger). This was reflected in the industry's strategy in the 
US: 
 
The fact that we could put something as an umbrella over them [individual 
producers], which would truly differentiate them from the traditional perceptions of 
venison in the market place was important. The idea was to build a new product 
category. We're not talking about another venison; we're talking about a whole 
different product. The fact that you had the balance between the appellation and 
individual company brands was the key. The key benefit of an appellation strategy is 
that we can develop a promotional program in a way that an individual company 
couldn't have done. But, at the same time, we needed to preserve the balance that 
allowed them to have their own individual identity and their own position in the 
market. (NZGIB) 
 
The program has been a success. However, while the NZGIB believe in promoting their product 
based upon COO, there is nothing about New Zealand that affects the products' intrinsic quality. 
This could provide opportunities for competitors. Chefs are very price conscious and (thanks to 
the training programs of the NZGIB) can replace Cervena-labelled venison with other countries' 
produce
3
. On top of this, deer can be processed into many different products, and demand in one 
market can affect the availability of Cervena-labelled meat, leading to fluctuating supply and 
prices. NZGIB want a global brand, but have no control over supply, and by limiting the program 
to New Zealand it may be impossible to maintain a positioning in world markets. For example, 
                                                          
3
 They may simply marinate the meat over night, or use very fresh cuts of meat from young animals. 
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by tying the strategy to COO, Zespri have also limited their ability to develop a global brand, as 
well as to own a category in stores, because consumers and retailers want the fruit to be supplied 
all year round, but New Zealand's growing season is only eight months long. Sealord also 
compete in global markets and must source fish from other suppliers for two months every year 
to meet demand. As such they limit their product-COO branding, so as not to confuse consumers, 
and to limit their ability to meet demand.  
 
The NZDB faced a different market, as they often have high brand awareness in their key 
markets, but low COO-brand awareness. For example, consumers know the 'Anchor' brand, but 
may not know it is from New Zealand, since the brand has been around for close to 100 years. 
The NZDB also aim to develop global brands, and need continuous supplies to meet the demands 
of large-scale retail chains. As a result they need to source products globally to smooth out low-
supply periods due to seasonal variation in New Zealand. For example: 
 
In some countries we sell non-New Zealand brands - we put the ingredients in but we 
won't put our guarantee on it. In some countries we put our guarantee on it. When we 
are using a New Zealand platform then obviously we have got to supply New Zealand 
products (with a guaranteed service), and when we are not we have the option. 
(NZDB) 
 
The NZDB tend to make use of COO in new markets. For example, COO is used to enter new 
markets, with products being promoted around a combination of the NZDB's track record, 
environmental cleanliness, and New Zealand imagery: 
 
We base our New Zealand imagery around clean, green, natural, and fresh 
[ingredients]. Consumers like it and understand it as a credible message. In some 
countries it's a very sustainable message and a competitive advantage, so we are quite 
happy to use that. In other countries it has no meaning, so you can't use it. For 
example, parts of Latin America can attack our claims of being fresh because 
everyone sources domestically so 'Made in New Zealand' doesn't necessarily have the 
[same] meaning over there. (NZDB) 
 14 
The need to develop global supplies means that NZDB is slowly moving away from a COO 
strategy, as new markets become established and, instead, emphasise the quality of brands such 
as 'Anchor', 'Mainland Cheese,' and 'Fernleaf'. The NZGIB also use COO in different ways for 
different markets. Due to the positive image of New Zealand among young Germans, the new 
NZGIB program focuses heavily around New Zealand's clean environment when they promote 
their product through modern restaurants. Unlike the US, venison has a long history of use in 
German cuisine, so there is little need to educate customers or chefs. Whereas in the US, the 
NZGIB provide significant support to culinary institutes, chefs, distributors, and the media about 
the product (which includes employing their own chef to educate current and up-and-coming 
chefs), due to the unfamiliarity of the market with the requirements of cooking zero-fat meat 
(cooking it for too long, or at low heat, will ruin the meat
4
). The NZGIB reported that working 
with culinary institutes gave the program a lot of credibility with the food press, enhancing the 
legitimacy of their strategy. COO, therefore, provides a significant level of differentiation in 
Germany for younger consumer segments, although this could only be gained as a result of 
demographic changes, lifestyle changes, and the development of large numbers of up-market 
bistros. Prior to this, venison was eaten mainly by older consumers during two yearly hunting 
festivals, and as such, COO brand strategies would have confused these consumers who expected 
to eat wild, hunted game, and not imported farmed game. The WINZ has also had to move away 
from pure COO images, due to the continual success of the industry and the COO programs in 
raising consumer awareness. For example: 
 
[Following] some consumer research last year, we are trying to develop a broader 
awareness with consumers. We are trying to educate consumers so that they know 
why there's a price difference between a New Zealand wine and a Chilean wine ...  
That, obviously, involves big budgets, so we'll be looking at working with tourism 
and food brands to combine together with an overall stronger, and broader story. 
(WINZ) 
                                                          
4
 Research showed that consumers thought venison would be tough to eat and very strong in flavour. Consumers also 
thought it was only suitable for winter, as it required many hours of preparation and cooking. The changes made by 
the NZGIB to move towards a farmed industry and strict quality controls meant that venison could be used for a 
variety of dishes throughout the year. However, the chefs, who can ruin the product if they cook it in the traditional 
way, largely determine the quality of the industry's message and product. This explains why the NZGIB focus on 
education in their brand program. 
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All the boards interviewed used New Zealand's clean environment as a source of competitive 
advantage. This was believed to be advantageous, particularly in seafood, where New Zealand's 
track record of fishing stock management is reported to be second to none. The WINZ 
positioning is based around the tag line, 'the benefits and riches of a clean green land'. This has 
created pressure for wineries to adopt sustainable management practices. To ensure the integrity 
of this positioning statement, the WINZ has recently promoted a new 'Code of Practice for 
Winery Waste Management: The Integrated Winegrape Production' scheme (with 200 
participants so far), and greater research into biological control of industry diseases. Other 
companies have gone further, with a group called 'Living Wine' becoming the first wineries in the 
world to gain the tough ISO14001 environmental accreditation. 
 
Sealord also use COO in their branding, but as just one part of their overall brand strategy. In a 
response to their commitment to environmental sustainability, Sealord make sure that they find 
markets for all the fish they catch, regardless of quality, and for all parts of the fish. This means 
they have a broad product range of high quality, strong-branded fish, and a range of commodity 
products (e.g., fish oil). They also have a range of fish that are unique to New Zealand's waters, 
and others that are available from a number of sources. As such, the high-quality local fish are 
branded with both the 'Sealord' brand and COO. Commodities are based on price, but are branded 
with the Sealord brand at a trade level, as this is believed to represent high-quality standards. 
COO is used in the general promotional material for Sealord, as it is committed to manage fish 
stocks and environmental sustainability. The company works closely with government 
departments and research institutes, and this profile builds its generic image with consumers.  
 
Merino NZ faced a different problem. Historically, all New Zealand wool was sold under the 
auspices of the Australian dominated International Wool Secretariat (IWS). New Zealand wool is 
lower quality and coarser than other wools, so it was blended by the IWS with Australian and 
South African wool to increase the tensile strength of the finer foreign wools. Due to poor market 
results, the New Zealand industry pulled out of the IWS in the 1980s, and developed the Wool 
Board. Due to climatic conditions, New Zealand Merino is the finest (in terms of microns) in the 
world. However, Merino makes up a tiny amount of the total New Zealand wool clip, and as such 
was blended in with other more coarse wools by the Wool Board. Merino growers believed they 
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were not gaining the recognition and returns they deserved and so formed their own association, 
Merino NZ, to establish markets for the wool. For example: 
 
The product attributes of New Zealand Merino were lost ...  [We] felt that if it [the 
wool] was branded and was taken to the market place in the correct manner by a 
marketing team that was purely focussed on New Zealand Merino we would gain 
better returns. (Merino NZ) 
 
The association targeted high-end fashion producers and designers as part of their niche strategy. 
While the product was of very high quality, designers can choose a number of equally high 
quality products to make garments, so the industry needed to support the product through 
investments in product quality measurement, quality improvements, stable supplies (by moving 
away from auction sales), relationship with value chain members, and stable prices. Merino NZ 
supports select designers with their own ingredient brand, and build the brand reputation by 
retaining control over its use (thereby keeping it exclusive), and using the auction markets to run 
the 'finest clip in the world' competition. In this case, the finest clip is auctioned off, and the price 
it receives and the buyer are promoted heavily throughout the fashion world, thereby helping the 
designer and building awareness of the Merino NZ brand. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The main propositions of this article are that the use of COO is affected by context, and that as 
the context changes, so must the use of COO. Earlier in the article we examined those contextual 
factors identified by COO researchers that impacted on the use of COO. While not all of these 
issues were examined in this research, a number of consumer-related and product-related features 
were borne out. However, a number of other contextual factors were also identified, namely 
resource-based factors, industry and market structure factors, as well as historical associations, 
legitimacy, and market action factors. These will be discussed below. 
 
Organizations deal with limited resources and must, therefore, attempt to develop strategies 
appropriate to their resource base (38). In all the cases, COO was utilized as part of a 
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differentiation strategy in international markets. In most instances the organizations believed that 
their 'New Zealandness' gave them a distinct advantage over competitors. However, not all 
organisations took this view. Generalist marketers such as the NZDB and Sealord placed more 
weight on their own reputations as opposed to their COO. Although some of their products are 
obviously marketed as 'Made in New Zealand' and based around New Zealand imagery, not all 
are. In contrast, specialist marketers relied heavily on COO. In some cases this makes a lot of 
sense. For products such as wine there are obvious links between place and taste. The same is 
true for wool, where the availability of feed and the climate affect the fineness of the fibre. New 
Zealand deer farmers have a lot of intellectual property based around New Zealand's environment 
and it therefore makes sense to utilise COO in their marketing. This suggests that resource base, 
strategy, product, and the nature of the targeted niche have an affect on COO use.  
 
Generalist marketers operate on a wide scale and scope (16, 39). As such they often deal with 
large buyers, selling to the mass market. Global forces have driven many of these retailers and 
producers to increase their size in order to have a global scope and to compete. For example, of 
the three generalists studied, the NZDB has formed alliances throughout a number of countries, 
and invested directly in many others. Sealord purchases fish on the open market to meet the needs 
of their customers. Zespri sell to supermarkets throughout the world. However, agricultural 
products present problems for global marketers. Firstly, seasonal availability, local growing 
conditions, and local supply levels have traditionally limited their capacity to develop global 
brands. The need to develop a global presence and brand has driven the NZDB and Sealord to 
source globally and, therefore, play down COO in most cases. This also explains the problems 
faced by Zespri, who target a global market, but are limited by an eight-month growing period in 
New Zealand. In this case, tying their brand to COO is in conflict with their positioning. It is also 
questionable whether this provides the basis for differentiation given that the product is sold as 
'kiwifruit,' which many consumers may assume is from New Zealand. 
 
The importance of resource base and strategic focus is highlighted in resource partitioning theory 
(39) that holds that generalists and specialists compete in different market niches, and face 
different market structures and pressures, which means that different strategies are required. As 
long as specialists and generalists do not overlap, then both will survive, and prosper (16). For 
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niche specialists such as Merino NZ, the NZGIB, or the WINZ, the use of COO fits their niche, 
as does the movement away from COO by the NZDB and Sealord. The difficulties faced by 
Zespri highlight the difficulties faced by a firm caught in the middle (39-40). 
 
While these variables are important, other issues need to be taken into account. Product 
characteristics affect the use of COO, with complex products more likely to benefit from the use 
of COO (2). In the case of venison, wool, and wine, this is clear. Venison requires complicated 
preparation; wine comes from different regions; and vintages, grapes, and producers, and merino 
wool has different uses, comes in a range of microns, and from different stations. Given the 
resource base of these industries they have been forced to target niche markets, but these markets 
are also more likely to be interested in a complex message. For example, restaurant staff selling 
Cervena were looking for a new story; high-end wine consumers are often passionate about the 
product; and top fashion houses and top-makers are interested in the COO of their product, as 
they are so focused on quality. Compare this to the NZDB who are deliberately moving away 
from COO as they are targeting the mass market, and are well aware that simple messages and 
consistent product quality are the keys to their success. 
 
Historical associations also play a role. In some cases, poor or unknown COO-product category 
links require producers to build up a reputation for quality category production. For example, the 
WINZ had to establish a category with buyers and consumers, and build awareness that New 
Zealand was capable of producing quality wine. For most of its history, New Zealand has 
exported little wine, and much of what was made was of poor quality. Historical associations also 
played an obvious role for Zespri, who argued that 'kiwifruit' had obviously New Zealand 
associations. However, their past failure to protect this word makes the use of COO questionable, 
and consumer research indicated that such a strategy simply raised the awareness of the category. 
In this case, COO could be included as part of a brand image, but their resource base and 
positioning requires them to move beyond COO. The past success of the NZDB meant that they 
could move away from COO with their mass brands as the brand has a strong consumer 
franchise. 
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For Merino NZ the lack of market awareness, and their small resource base, led them to target 
luxury fashion retailers. However, past practices leading to mixed quality, unstable prices and 
supply meant Merino NZ lacked the credibility to successfully implement such a strategy alone. 
As such they worked closely with influential chain members such as cloth manufacturers in Italy, 
who carried more credibility with retailers and designers. In this case, COO played a supporting 
role to establish the credibility of the brand and then moved to a more dominant role to provide a 
further point of differentiation. In all cases, market structure also plays a role. In wine, the 
established 'dominant marketing design' (41) was one based on region of origin ('Burgundy' or 
'French wines'), which meant that retailers categorised wines according to COO. This market 
structure means that new entrants must build an in-store category, and thus COO will play a 
dominant role in any marketing campaign aiming to establish this. The same applies to the 
German and US venison markets. In the case of the former, the strength of the buyers limits the 
ability to develop a separate brand franchise, so producers must either target different end 
consumers (say, younger restaurant consumers), or match their offer to the needs of buyers. In the 
case of the NZGIB, they have done both, selling lesser-quality venison to the retail buyers and 
targeting higher quality meat to restaurants frequented by young people. In the US case, the 
structure was different, requiring another approach.  
 
However, the role of industry structure on COO appropriateness was also moderated by 
consumer awareness of the country. For example, research showed that younger German 
consumers had a positive image of New Zealand and its natural environment. As such it made 
perfect sense to target them with COO imagery to this effect. In the case of US consumers and 
buyers, many had little knowledge of New Zealand, and therefore more visual imagery 
(mountains, hills etc.) was needed to create an implied awareness of a clean environment in the 
minds of buyers. This was also carried out as part of an educational strategy in the US, but not in 
Germany, where there was an established knowledge base when it came to dealing with venison. 
Legitimacy also played a role. The NZDB preferred not to use New Zealand environmental 
imagery in South American countries, as the message would lack credibility. Using COO to 
market venison to older traditional game consumers in Germany, and in some US states where 
hunting is established, would also raise concerns among these consumers. 
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Finally, strategy must evolve as the market changes. However, firm action also changes the 
structure of the market (17-18). This has implications for COO and suggests that COO ultimately 
has limitations. For example, the Merino NZ developed a strategy based upon strong 
relationships with suppliers, used auction markets in the 'Clip of the year' competition to raise the 
profile of New Zealand Merino wool, and provided the buyer of the top clip with significant 
exposure. This strategy was unique for the wool and fibre industries at the time, and quickly 
became the dominant design (41). However, competitors, who do not have to go through the set 
up costs, copied the strategy. As such, the advantage potentially moves to later entrants who can 
deliver the same quality wool but at a cheaper price (say from a larger base such as Australia) 
(42). Therefore the COO strategy must evolve, and Merino NZ is now starting to promote the 
individual sheep stations, and their unique history in the same way that the WINZ has now 
started to promote individual regions. The same situation affected the NZGIB. Finally, such 
programs may limit the ability to enter into other market segments. For example, the investments 
in the Cervena program made by chefs may also limit the ability of the NZGIB to enter other, 
higher-growth markets. For example, the program is tied into high-end restaurants, but the 
growth is coming from up-market bistros, which compete for the same customers as high-end 
restaurants. Channel conflict may, therefore, emerge, and could help competitors develop a 
similar program for up-market bistros now that the NZGIB has established the profile of venison. 
 
The findings also identified a number of issues unique to agriculture. Many of the limitations 
faced by these organisation relate to the producer / marketing board structure, where members are 
often unable to capture the value of the board's activities, and therefore refuse to make the 
necessary trade-offs between increased short term commodity prices, and long term stable prices 
and supply which helps build brand value (43). While this issue is unlikely to affect many firms, 
it does highlight a potential problem for members of regions or countries (such as members of a 
Bordeaux wine region), which may be engage in behavior that undermines the value of the COO 
or ROO brand, and as such affects their own long term potential. This suggests that a further 
contextual variable for operationalising COO relates to the issue of property rights. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The findings would imply a contingency model of COO (8). They would also suggest that the use 
of COO needs to placed within a dynamic framework that views the use of COO from an 
evolutionary perspective (16). It was mentioned that the use of COO is contingent upon the 
COO-product category history. Managers, therefore, should assess carefully the history of 
category association before they embark on using COO to raise consumer and trade awareness of 
their products. If a country has a negative COO-product category history it may be detrimental to 
use COO in a brand program. Even when a country has a positive COO-product category history 
the use of COO may make it difficult for small-scale producers to develop consistent supplies of 
seasonal products. Managers should also be thinking about COO programs long term. For 
example, most agribusinesses have moved away from narrow COO-based strategies and are now 
supporting their COO brands with market-based relationships. This is similar to what most 
companies do when their products reach the maturity phase, and means that COO has less 
importance when consumers become more familiar with the products. 
 
This research focused on organisations that used COO at a business-to-business as well as a 
business-consumer level. As such, it helps fill a gap in the COO literature, where the role of COO 
at a business-to-business level remains relatively unexplored (29). This research concurs with 
these authors' views that COO is a complex construct, and that its affect is neither universal nor 
uniform. COO did influence buyers, but in different ways. In some cases, positive imagery from 
New Zealand was used to enhance the buying experience, possibly alleviating the uncertainty 
associated with new products or new suppliers. In other cases, COO was used to enhance 
perceptions of quality and environmental integrity. This was used in markets were COO product 
category knowledge was high, and where issues such as environmental integrity carried 
legitimacy. Organisations moved away from COO when it lacked meaning or integrity for buyers 
(traditional German venison consumers), or when changes in the market meant that COO was no 
longer a sufficient vehicle for conveying the complexity of the marketing message (for example, 
the emergence of wine regions meant that COO no longer captured to depth of the industry). 
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It is outside the scope of this article to fully develop a formal contingency model for COO use. 
The complexity of the issue (partly identified here) means that future research is required. This 
will of necessity involve fieldwork in other industry contexts, as agricultural marketing has many 
unique features. We have, therefore, tried to isolate industry specific variables that affect on 
agriculture (such as producer marketing boards), and focus on more generic issues. However, we 
have raised a number of wider macro marketing, and firm level variables that require further 
examination in the context of using COO as a brand. 
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Appendix 1. Characteristics of the different agribusinesses 
 
Merino New Zealand (Merino NZ) 
Merino farmers petitioned the New Zealand Wool Board to form their own association, as they believed they could better represent their own needs. Merino NZ 
developed a carefully crafted branding program, 'Merino NZ', which they control. Fashion houses can use this brand under mutual agreement as part of their 
own branding programs. The brand is heavily based around COO and New Zealand imagery, and Merino NZ works closely with buyers to maintain the 
positioning. 
Sealord 
Sealord Fisheries sells a large range of branded and unbranded fish. It operates in global markets where its brands are positioned at all price points. Sealord 
sources globally to smooth out shortages in supply due to licensing constraints and seasonal factors. As such it relies on the 'Sealord' brand to position its 
branded products. However, due to a worldwide problem of over-fishing, Sealord work closely with the New Zealand government to manage fish stocks and, in 
doing so, use COO for their New Zealand-sourced products and in their generic promotion as part of a responsible fishing scheme.  
The New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) 
The NZDB is responsible for selling and branding most of New Zealand's dairy produce. The NZDB can source globally, and has developed a number of 
successful brand programs that use COO depending on the context. As a result of their success, the NZDB has been asked to manage a number of dairy-related 
categories by large retailers, and, as such, use a number of brand awareness programs and relational programs to underpin their brands. 
The New Zealand Game Industry Board (NZGIB) 
Venison from New Zealand was initially sold on the basis of price with Germany being the key market. The failure of one COO brand in Germany led the 
NZGIB to seek new markets. The NZGIB launched another brand program, 'Cervena', which was targeted at the restaurant trade in the US. However, while the 
Board believe in promoting their product as New Zealand COO, there is nothing about New Zealand that affects the products' intrinsic quality. Deer can be 
processed into many different products, and demand in one market can affect the availability of Cervena-labelled meat, leading to fluctuating supply and prices. 
NZGIB want a global brand but have no control over supply. 
The Wine Institute of New Zealand (WINZ) 
Without a history of wine exports, or a quality wine production, the New Zealand industry faced a challenging task to develop brand awareness. With increased 
quality, the industry had the product, but the industry's small size meant that it lacked the resources to develop mass awareness programs. The WINZ undertakes 
generic country-based promotion to raise awareness of New Zealand wine in key markets. However, consumers now want more detail about each separate 
producing region and brand. 
Zespri International (Zespri) 
In response to failing prices the industry implemented a strong consumer-oriented marketing program, re-branding the kiwifruit 'Zespri' and working closely 
with a former government research agency 'HortResearch' to develop new fruit varieties. The brand strategy has again been tied strongly to COO, which means 
that Zespri have limited their ability to develop a global brand, as well as to own a category in stores. HortResearch, which needs to gain private sources of 
funding, have now licensed the rights to the new kiwifruit varieties to overseas competitors thus removing Zespri's point of differentiation. 
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Appendix 2. Data sources 
 
Organization Number of 
interviews 
Interviewees Secondary information 
Merino NZ
 
2  Chairman 
 Marketing manager  
 Historical case studies of the wool industry. 
 McKinsey and Company industry review. 
 Company documents 
 Newspaper articles 
 Business periodicals and reports 
Sealord
 
1  International 
marketing manager 
 Television documentary on Sealord 
 Company information 
 Newspapers articles  
 Business press articles 
NZDB
 
2  International 
marketing manager  
 Historical case studies on the dairy 
industry. 
 McKinsey and Company industry review 
 Newspaper articles 
 Trade and general business press 
 Annual reports 
NZGIB 6  Concept designer 
 Company owner of 
Venison and 
Cervena franchisee 
 Current Chairman 
and Marketing 
manager 
 Two former 
chairmen 
 Historical case studies of the deer industry 
 Company documents 
 Newspaper articles 
 Business periodical and reports 
 Web site information 
WINZ
 
30  Four members of the 
WINZ board 
 26 winery owners 
 Industry reports 
 Company documents  
 Newspaper articles 
 Business periodicals and reports 
 Web site information 
Zespri  5  Manager for Turners 
and Growers
1
  
 Marketing manager 
for Australasia 
 Market analyst  
 Brand manager 
 Business 
development 
manager 
 Historical case studies of the kiwifruit 
industry 
 Case study of the Horticulture and Food 
Research Institute of New Zealand 
 Study of kiwifruit consumers 
 Company documents and marketing 
material 
 Business periodicals and reports 
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Appendix 3. Programs of each agribusiness 
 
Case Merino NZ Sealord NZDB NZGIB WINZ Zespri 
Brand programs  COO  
 Co-brand with 
selected 
customers 
 Push and pull. 
 
 Global 
 Source globally 
 Push and pull 
 Global  
 Source globally  
 Push and pull 
 COO 
 Appellation  
 Push and pull 
 COO 
 Appellation  
 Push and pull 
 Global aim with 
COO base 
 Pull. 
Programs  Develop 
generic 
ingredient 
brand 
 Manage 
promotional 
material 
 Facilitate 
contracts 
between buyers 
and sellers 
 Research 
 Lobbying 
 Quality 
programs 
 Develop co-
brands between 
Merino NZ and 
buyers 
 Develop 
customised 
marketing 
material for 
client 
 Brand 
marketing 
programs 
 Research 
 Export 
programs 
 Source globally 
 Manage fish 
stocks 
 Develop NZ 
brands for 
FMCG 
 Develop 
commodity 
brands 
 Lobbying 
 Research 
 Manage 
categories of 
dairy products 
at retail level 
 Source products 
from overseas 
 Set up overseas 
representation 
 Quality 
programs 
 Lobbying 
 Manage a 
variety of 
generic 
branding 
programs 
 Assist with 
marketing 
funding for 
industry 
members 
 Facilitate 
relationships 
between buyers 
and sellers 
 Research 
 Lobbying 
 Maintain 
offices in key 
export markets 
 Develop 
generic 
marketing 
programs 
 Assist exporters 
 Research 
 Monitor 
compliance 
with health and 
label integrity 
programs 
 Zespri branding 
program 
 Research and 
development 
partnership with 
HortResearch 
 Lobbying 
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Appendix 4. Successes achieved by each agribusiness 
 
Case Merino NZ Sealord NZDB NZGIB WINZ Zespri 
Success  Increased value 
and quality of 
wool clip 
 Leading 
ingredient 
brand with 
high-end 
European 
fashion houses 
 Established 
brands at 
consumer and 
retail level 
 Manages fish 
stocks in a 
sustainable way 
 ROI above 
market average 
 Price has risen 
as volume has 
increased 
 Maintains 15 
per cent ROA 
 Has a number 
of leading fast 
moving 
consumer goods 
and commodity 
brands 
 Established 
market player, 
and invested 
abroad 
successfully 
 Success has 
lead to 
increased 
demands for 
category 
management 
from retailers 
 Have increased 
volume and 
value of exports 
 Have developed 
strong trade and 
consumer 
brands and 
established new 
export markets 
 High degree of 
industry 
satisfaction 
with institute 
 Highest per litre 
return for wine 
in the world 
 Established 
'New Zealand 
category' in the 
UK and moving 
to do it in the 
USA and 
Australia 
 Short-term 
returns to 
growers have 
been increased 
but brand 
equity among 
consumers 
remains low 
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Appendix 5. Challenges encountered by each agribusiness 
 
Case Merino NZ Sealord NZDB NZGIB WINZ Zespri 
Challenges  Political 
uncertainty 
 Reduced 
funding 
 Need to take all 
Merino wool 
regardless of 
quality 
 Competition 
with man made 
fires 
 Managing 
conflicting 
desires of 
farmers and 
supply chain 
members 
 Retaining 
positioning 
 Farmers cannot 
capture value of 
brand 
 Falling fish 
stocks 
worldwide 
 Need for new 
products 
 Small size 
relative to 
competitors and 
retailers 
 Must take all 
milk available 
 Political 
uncertainty. 
Industry tied to 
one strategy 
 Competition 
from private 
companies 
 Still commodity 
price based 
 Distance to 
markets and 
product 
complexity 
inhibits new 
product 
development 
 Threat of de-
listing if brands 
not number one 
or two 
 Farmers cannot 
capture value of 
brands 
 Intra-industry 
politics 
 Decreased 
funding 
 Failure to 
develop 
programs for all 
products, not 
just venison 
 Prices highly 
reliant on 
Korean 
economy 
 Has increased 
demand, but 
cannot control 
supply, leading 
to price 
fluctuations and 
dissatisfaction 
 Increased 
competition 
 Inability to 
source globally 
leads to supply 
problems 
 Strong 
distributors in 
key venison 
market 
 No way for 
industry to 
capture value of 
brands 
 Highly taxed 
and regulated 
industry 
 Increased 
competition 
 Refusal of 
government to 
enforce 
integrity 
programs 
 EU regulations 
to market entry 
 Need to build 
on original 
strategy 
 Need for new 
markets 
 Less funding 
relative to 
competitors 
 Intra-industry 
politics 
 Must find 
market for all 
grades of fruit 
 Programs have 
raised profile of 
all kiwifruits 
 Focus on 
increasing 
returns to 
growers leads 
to wild price 
fluctuations, 
causing buyer 
dissatisfaction 
 ROO focus 
leads to supply 
shortages 
 HortResearch 
owns new 
product brands, 
has licensed 
them to 
competitors 
 Political 
uncertainty 
 Consumers not 
prepared to pay 
price 
differential for 
Zespri fruit 
 No way for 
growers to 
capture value of 
brand 
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